Abstract-The degrees of freedom (DoF) of the two-user Gaussian multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) broadcast channel with confidential messages is studied under the assumption that delayed channel state information (CSI) is available at the transmitter. We characterize the optimal secrecy DoF (SDoF) region and show that it can be achieved by a simple artificial noise alignment scheme. The proposed scheme sends the confidential messages superposed with the artificial noise over several time slots. Exploiting delayed CSI, the transmitter aligns the transmit signal in such a way that the useful message can be extracted at the intended receiver but is completely drowned by the artificial noise at the unintended receiver. The proposed scheme can be regarded as a nontrivial extension of Maddah-Ali Tse scheme and enables us to quantify the resource overhead, or equivalently the DoF loss, to be paid for the secure communications.
Abstract-The degrees of freedom (DoF) of the two-user Gaussian multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) broadcast channel with confidential messages is studied under the assumption that delayed channel state information (CSI) is available at the transmitter. We characterize the optimal secrecy DoF (SDoF) region and show that it can be achieved by a simple artificial noise alignment scheme. The proposed scheme sends the confidential messages superposed with the artificial noise over several time slots. Exploiting delayed CSI, the transmitter aligns the transmit signal in such a way that the useful message can be extracted at the intended receiver but is completely drowned by the artificial noise at the unintended receiver. The proposed scheme can be regarded as a nontrivial extension of Maddah-Ali Tse scheme and enables us to quantify the resource overhead, or equivalently the DoF loss, to be paid for the secure communications.
Index Terms-Delayed channel state information, Gaussian broadcast channels, interference alignment, multiple-antenna channels, physical-layer security, wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
W E consider the two-user Gaussian multi-input multi-output (MIMO) broadcast channel (BC) with confidential messages (BCC), where the transmitter sends two confidential messages to receivers A and B, respectively, while keeping each of them secret to the unintended receiver. Note that this channel boils down to the conventional Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel where the transmitter wishes to send one message to the intended receiver while keeping it secret to the other one, namely, the eavesdropper.
The secrecy capacity region of the two-user MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with perfect channel state information at transmitter (CSIT) and receivers has been characterized in [3] (see also references therein). As a special case, the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel has been extensively studied in [4] - [8] . However, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with general (imperfect) CSI at the transmitter remains open. Since a complete characterization of the capacity region in this case is prohibitive, a number of recent contributions have focused on the so-called secrecy degrees of freedom (SDoF), by capturing the behavior in high-SNR regime (see [9] - [12] and references therein). Liang et al. [9] - [11] investigated the compound models where channel uncertainty at the encoder is modeled as a set of finite channel states, while [12] investigated the scenario where the transmitter knows some temporal structure of the block-fading processes. A fundamental observation is that unless two channels enjoy asymmetric statistical properties, 1 the perfect secrecy cannot be guaranteed under a general CSIT assumption. In other words, if the channels of two receivers have the same statistics, additional side information incurring some asymmetry between the channels is required at the transmitter in order to ensure a positive SDoF. As a matter of fact, this reveals one of the major limitations of the wiretap model whose performance strongly depends on the quality of the channel state information at the transmitter side. Studying the impact of partial CSI on secrecy systems is therefore of practical and theoretical interest. Recently, in the context of multiantenna broadcast channel, the pioneering work [2] showed that completely outdated channel state information at the transmitter is still very useful and increases the degrees of freedom of the multiuser channel. Motivated by this exciting result, the new assumption, commonly referred to as delayed CSIT, has been applied to several multiuser settings, including the MIMO broadcast channel, X channel, and interference channel [13] - [16] . Noticeable improvement of degrees of freedom has been shown in all these settings with delayed CSIT. The main idea behind the utility of delayed CSIT can be best described with the term "retrospective interference alignment" introduced in [14] and [17] . That is, the knowledge of strictly causal channel state is used to align the interference between users into a spatial/temporal subspace with a reduced dimension at each receiver.
In this paper, we study the impact of delayed CSIT on the secrecy degrees of freedom in a MIMO broadcast channel. In our setting, delayed CSI of a given receiver is available both at the transmitter and the other receiver, 2 whereas each receiver knows its own instantaneous channel. Such a scenario is of practical interest since the receivers may send their channel states to the transmitter via delayed feedback links that may be overheard by the other receivers. We first characterize the optimal SDoF of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT. It is shown that delayed CSIT can significantly improve the SDoF, in particular when the transmitter has more antennas than either of the receivers does. In this case, we prove that a simple artificial noise alignment scheme achieves the optimal SDoF. The proposed scheme sends the confidential symbols embedded by the artificial noise in such a way that the artificial noise is aligned in a subspace at the legitimate receiver while it fills the full signal space at the eavesdropper. The case of partial knowledge where the transmitter has delayed CSI only on the legitimate channel is also investigated. In this case, we show that a strictly smaller SDoF is achieved compared to the case with delayed CSIT on both channels. Then, we consider the two-user Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel and characterize the optimal SDoF region. The achievability follows from an artificial noise alignment scheme adapted to convey two confidential messages. The proposed scheme can be seen as a nontrivial extension of the space-time alignment scheme of Maddah-Ali and Tse [2] , hereafter referred to as the Maddah-Ali Tse (MAT) scheme. A simple comparison with the MAT scheme enables us to quantify the resource overhead, or equivalently the DoF loss, to be paid to guarantee the confidentiality of messages. Although delayed CSIT is found to be beneficial for a large range of transmit antennas analogy to the conclusions drawn for other network systems without secrecy constraints [2] , [14] , [15] , we remark that the lack of perfect CSIT significantly degrades the performance of the secrecy systems. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in [19] and [20] , the authors characterized the secrecy capacity region of the erasure broadcast channel under the similar delayed CSI assumption. Although our scheme and the scheme proposed in [19] and [20] share a similar multiphase nature, they are conceptually different in the way how the encoder creates the side information shared by a transmitter-receiver pair and exploits such side information to hide the confidential messages. In particular, our scheme uses an analog signal (artificial noise) seen by each receiver, while the latter is based on digital secret keys.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the assumptions and some useful lemmas while Section III summarizes our main results on the optimal SDoF. Sections IV and V are devoted to the proof of the main theorems. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI with some open problems and future perspectives.
Throughout the paper, we use the following notational conventions. Boldface lower-case letters and upper-case letters are used to denote vectors and matrices, respectively. We use the superscript notation to denote a sequence for any type of variables. Matrix transpose, Hermitian transpose, inverse, trace, and determinant are denoted by , , , , and , respectively. We let denote the block diagonal matrix with the matrices as diagonal elements. Logarithm is in base 2. The differential entropy of is denoted by . means . The Kronecker product of and is denoted by . The little-o notation stands for any real-valued function such that . We use the dot equality to denote the equality on the "pre-log" factor, i.e., is equivalent to ; the dot inequalities and are similarly defined. Throughout the paper, we use the same notation for random and nonrandom variables wherever confusion is unlikely.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
Let , , and denote the number of antennas at the transmitter, receiver A, and receiver B, respectively. Then, the corresponding channel outputs are given by
where denotes the observations at the receivers A and B, respectively, at time instant ; are the associated channel matrices; are assumed to be i.i.d. additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN)
; the input vector is subject to the average power constraint (2) Note that since we normalize the noise variances, is identified with the SNR at the transmitter side. Furthermore, we assume that and are mutually independent and change from an instant to another one in an i.i.d. manner.
The following assumptions and definitions will be applied in the rest of the paper. 4 The following two properties are used repeatedly in the rest of the paper.
Property 1 (positiveness of differential entropy): Let and any random variables that are independent of the noise sequences and in (1), respectively. Then, we have
Since conditioning does not increase differential entropy, we have and similarly . It is important to remark that the above positiveness is due to the normalized AWGN in (1). Since normalization is always allowed at the outputs of the channel and is information lossless, this assumption is without loss of generality. Another property is a direct consequence of the channel symmetry given in Assumption 2, stated as follows.
Property 2 (entropy symmetry of channel outputs): Let be the collection of random variables representing all antenna outputs at time instant . Then, for any subset and of random variables in satisfying , we have
This property holds because the current channel outputs do not depend on the future states and that the conditional entropies at hand result from averaging over the current state that is symmetric for all outputs.
For the sake of clarity, we collect the results that will be used repeatedly in the rest of the paper. First, the following lemma is a direct consequence of the entropy symmetry.
Lemma 1 (properties of channel symmetry):
The following inequalities hold under the entropy symmetry from Property 2:
where we define Furthermore, same inequalities hold true conditional on .
Proof: The first two inequalities are proved in Appendix A. To prove (5c), we have from (5a) where the last inequality comes from Property 1, i.e.,
. Same steps can be applied to obtain (5d).
Then, all the achievable DoF results are essentially based on the rank of the channel matrices.
Lemma 2: For any matrix that does not depend on , we have Proof: Let be the nonzero singular values of . Then, since the nonzero singular values do not depend on and therefore do not vanish with either.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we highlight our main results on the optimal SDoF of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel and then on the more general Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel with confidential messages. We shall interpret the results through comparisons and numerical evaluations.
A. Wiretap Channel Theorem 1 (wiretap channel with delayed CSIT):
In the presence of delayed CSIT on both the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper's channel, the optimal SDoF of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with ,
, and antennas at the transmitter, the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper, respectively, is given by (6) where we define
In the wiretap setting, it is not always reasonable to assume any knowledge on the eavesdropper's channel at the transmitter side. In this case, we may consider delayed CSIT only on the legitimate channel and with no CSIT on the eavesdropper's channel. With this asymmetric CSI assumption, hereafter referred to as delayed partial CSIT, we can show that a strictly positive yet smaller SDoF than in the case of delayed CSIT on both channels is still achievable for a wide range of number of antennas.
Theorem 2 (wiretap channel with delayed partial CSIT):
In the presence of delayed partial CSIT, either on the legitimate channel or the eavesdropper's channel, the following SDoF is achievable for MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel:
Note that it is the best-known achievable SDoF in this setting, although the converse is yet to be proved.
In order to quantify the benefit of delayed CSIT, we summarize the SDoF with perfect, delayed, and no CSIT, respectively, in Table I , and provide an example with in Fig. 1 . We remark that delayed CSIT is beneficial only when the number of transmit antennas is larger than the number of receive antennas, i.e., , since the SDoF is for with perfect, delayed, and without CSIT. As the number of transmit antennas increases, the SDoF grows until for perfect and delayed CSIT while it does not increase with without CSIT. It appears that with both perfect and delayed CSIT, we cannot exploit . Furthermore, we remark that delayed CSIT only on the legitimate channel incurs a nonnegligible loss compared to delayed CSIT on both channels. This is because the transmitter without CSI on the eavesdropper's channel cannot access to the signal overheard by the eavesdropper, which reduces the signal dimension to be exploited by the legitimate receiver.
B. Broadcast Channel With Confidential Messages
Next, we present the optimal SDoF region of the two-user Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel with delayed CSIT.
Theorem 3 (BCC with delayed CSIT):
The optimal SDoF region of the two-user Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel with delayed CSIT is given as a set of nonnegative satisfying (7a) Remark 1: We can find trivial outer bounds to the above SDoF region for the case of . On the one hand, the SDoF region with delayed CSIT is dominated by the SDoF region with perfect CSIT. The SDoF region with perfect CSIT is square connecting three corner points , , and
. We can also compare the above SDoF region with delayed CSIT and the DoF region of the two-user MIMO-BC with delayed CSIT [13] , given by Obviously, since SDoF is always upper bounded by DoF of the MIMO channel without secrecy constraints, namely, and , the SDoF region is dominated by the DoF region.
We provide an insight into the proposed artificial noise alignment scheme which achieves the sum SDoF point over the two-user MISO broadcast channel, i.e., and . Let us consider the four-slot scheme where the transmitter sends six independent Gaussian distributed symbols , , whose powers scale equally with . Specifically, the transmit vectors are given by where, for simplicity of demonstration, we omit the scaling factors that fulfill the power constraint (2) . Note that this simplification, also adopted in [2] and other related works, does not affect the high-SNR analysis carried out here. The following remarks are in order. First, it can be easily shown that, at receiver A, lies in a 2-D subspace, while the unintended signal plus the artificial noise are aligned in another 2-D subspace. Thus, the intended message can be recovered through from the 4-D observation at receiver A. Second, is drowned in the observation at receiver B. More precisely, at receiver B, is squeezed into a 1-D subspace filled with artificial noise, which makes it impossible to recover any useful information of receiver A. Due to the symmetry, the same holds for . Therefore, we can send simultaneously two confidential symbols to each receiver over four slots, yielding the sum SDoF point . The four-slot scheme contains two special cases of interest. If we consider the MISO wiretap channel where the transmitter wishes to convey to receiver A while keeping it secret to receiver B, we let and ignore the third time slot. This provides a SDoF of . If we consider the two-user MISO-BC without secrecy constraint, we remove the artificial noise transmission by letting and ignoring the first time slot. This boils down to the MAT scheme [2] . The four-slot scheme as well as the more general artificial noise alignment scheme presented in Section V is indeed a nontrivial extension of retrospective interference alignment schemes for MIMO broadcast channels [2] , [13] to secure communications. The comparison with the three-slot MAT scheme can be interpreted as follows. The messages can be kept secret at a price of an additional resource (one slot), which appears as a DoF loss with respect to the communication systems without secrecy constraint.
In order to visualize the DoF loss due to the secrecy constraints, we provide an example of the optimal DoF/SDoF regions with , , and in Fig. 2 . For the case of perfect CSIT, the SDoF region and the DoF region are square. In the MIMO-BC, we send private symbols to receivers A and B, respectively, over a duration of slots, yielding the DoF , as shown in [13] . Under the perfect secrecy con- straints, we need an extra phase of the artificial noise transmission of slots to convey two streams securely. This yields the SDoF of . The comparison with the DoF region of the MIMO-BC without secrecy constraints can be interpreted in either an optimistic or a pessimistic way. On the one hand, the benefit of delayed CSIT is more significant for the SDoF region. On the other hand, we also observe that the lack of accurate CSIT decreases substantially the SDoF, which implies that the secure communications are very sensitive to the quality of CSIT.
IV. WIRETAP CHANNEL: PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2

A. Converse Proof of Theorem 1
We are now ready to provide the converse by considering different cases below.
Case : From Fano's inequality and the secrecy constraint, we have (8) where the second inequality is from the fact that is nonnegative and is positive from Property 1; (8) follows straightforwardly from (5a) where we recall that ; the last inequality comes from the fact that i.i.d. Gaussian variables maximize the differential entropies under the variance constraint.
Case : In this case, we have and . We remark that two upper bounds can be obtained as a direct consequence of Lemma 1. On the one hand, (8) (10) where (9) follows from (5d); (10) follows from . Combining the above two upper bounds, we obtain
where (11) is obtained by relaxing the constraints between and and replacing and with and , respectively, which does not reduce the value of the maximization; we define and ; in (12) the inner maximization is solved by equalizing the two terms inside , and finally we use . This establishes the converse proof.
B. Achievability Proof of Theorem 1
In the following, we wish to show the achievability of the SDoF given by (6) . As in the converse part, we consider separately the cases for different . Note that only two ranges of need to be considered. The first one is and the other one is . For , the converse shows that the SDoF is zero. For , the converse shows that it does not help in terms of SDoF to use more than transmit antennas. Case : For this case, we need to show that is achievable for . This can be simply done by sending a vector of symbols of which symbols are useful message and the other symbols are artificial noise (or a random message). The legitimate receiver can decode all symbols and therefore extract the useful message, i.e., for any arbitrary channel realization ,
while the eavesdropper's channel is inflated by the random message and does not expose more than a vanishing fraction of the useful message embedded in , i.e.,
where we used the fact that and with probability 1. Note that (13) and (14) are obtained by applying independent Gaussian signaling to and with proper covariance corresponding to the power constraint. This assumption will be implicitly applied in the rest of the paper.
Case : The proposed scheme combines the artificial noise with the MAT scheme. The main idea of this scheme is to send the artificial noise such that it fills the eavesdropper's observation and hides the confidential message, while it shall be aligned in a reduced subspace at the legitimate receiver. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the codeword length where is the block length with specified in Table III and is the number of blocks over which the codeword spans. Each block is a repeated pattern of a three-phase transmission, described in Table II where the signal model without thermal noise is described concisely with the block matrix notation:
The three phases are explained as follows: 5 As mentioned before, we ignore the scaling factor necessary to meet the power constraint. The same holds for the transmit vector in phase 3. where (16) follows due to the block-triangular structure of and from the fact that the rank in the second term of (15) corresponds to the rank of the identity matrix; (17) follows by letting (19) and using the fact that chooses the first columns in each block inside such that is a square block diagonal matrix that is invertible by Assumption 2. Since both and are block diagonal matrices with the same number of blocks, it is readily shown that a simple row permutation can convert into a block diagonal matrix.
Note that each block of permuted matrix is a square matrix composed of different rows from the matrices and . Since permutation preserves the rank of a matrix, we have with probability 1, from which and Table III we obtain (18) . On the other hand, the eavesdropper's observation is filled by the artificial noise and therefore does not expose more than a vanishing fraction of the useful message, i.e., for any arbitrary channel realization,
where the first equality holds due to the Markov chains and ; (20) follows by noticing that the rank of is determined by the submatrix corresponding to first two phases; (21) is from the fact that the third block row is composed of linear combinations of rows from the second block row; (22) follows by letting (25) and using the fact that is invertible with probability 1 by construction of and Assumption 2. Note that a simple row permutation can convert into a block diagonal matrix each block of which is a square matrix composed of different rows from the matrices and . Since permutation preserves the rank of a matrix, we have with probability 1 and hence obtain (23). From Table III , we obtain (24). Finally, from (18) and (24), we conclude that in average useful symbols can be conveyed securely over time slots, yielding a SDoF of .
C. Achievability Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we provide the achievability proof for the case of delayed partial CSIT when the transmitter has delayed CSI only on the legitimate channel. For the case , we can easily show that the desired SDoF follows by using only antennas out of , i.e., by replacing by similarly to the case of delayed CSIT on both channels. For the case , the scheme proposed in Section IV-B.1 can be applied here to achieve a SDoF of , since it does not require any CSIT. Therefore, it follows that a SDoF of is achievable when . In the rest of the section, we focus on the case . We propose a variant of the artificial noise alignment scheme described previously. The lack of CSIT on the eavesdropper's channel requires the following modifications. First, the transmission consists of first two phases presented in Table II , because the lack of CSI on the eavesdropper's channel does not enable the transmitter to repeat the signal overheard by the eavesdropper (corresponding to the third phase). Consequently, the confidential symbols sent during the second phase must be decoded within this phase. This decreases the dimension of from to . After two phases, the observations are given by Following similar steps as before and choosing in (25), it is readily shown that, for any arbitrary channel realization, As a result, in average useful symbols can be conveyed securely over time slots in the high-SNR regime, yielding the SDoF of .
D. Comments on the Perfect Secrecy
In fact, a closer inspection of the above achievability schemes reveals that perfect secrecy is not achieved in the sense that where the right-hand side is not necessarily 0. The proposed artificial noise alignment schemes guarantee that the eavesdropper can obtain a vanishing fraction of useful information when goes to infinity. In order to strengthen the result, we need to combine the ANA schemes with random binning. Since the alignment creates an equivalent memoryless channel , the following rate is achievable with perfect secrecy Let us recall that , , and . Hence, we achieve perfect secrecy for the original channel, i.e., It is worth mentioning that the input distribution for the equivalent channel is independent of the state realization due to the lack of perfect CSIT. The achievability can be shown by following exactly the same steps in [1] by adding channel state. Therefore, we conclude that the results established in Theorems 1 and 2 hold with perfect secrecy.
V. BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES:
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
A. Converse
We focus on the case in the following. The converse for the other cases is trivial from Section IV. The secrecy constraint (3) together with Fano's inequality for , i.e., , yields
Similarly to the converse of the MIMO wiretap channel, we obtain two upper bounds on . The first bound is obtained by combining (26) with Fano's inequality on , i.e., , where the second inequality follows by ; the last inequality follows from inequality (5a) in Lemma 1. The second bound is (10) which also holds here by replacing with , namely, Putting the two upper bounds together, we have
Meanwhile, Fano's inequality for leads to
Summing the above two inequalities with weight and , respectively, yields where we define and in the first inequality; the second inequality is due to the relaxation of the constraints between and where we define and ; the third inequality is established by choosing that equalizes both terms in ; and the last equality is due to . By dividing both sides by and letting grow, we obtain the first desired inequality (7a). Due to the symmetry of the problem, (7b) can be obtained by swapping the roles of and . This completes the converse proof.
B. Achievability
The corner points can be achieved by the alignment scheme described in Section IV. Here, we provide a strategy achieving the sum SDoF point. In fact, the alignment scheme for the MIMO wiretap channel in Section IV can be suitably modified to convey two confidential messages. We focus on the case because the converse proof says that we only need to use antennas for the case . For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the codeword length where is the block length with specified in Table V . Each block is a repeated pattern of a four-phase transmission, described in Table IV where the signal model without thermal noise is described concisely with the block matrix notation:
where the durations of four phases are given in Table V : sending the confidential symbols with the artificial noise seen by receiver A. In time slots, we send the useful symbols represented by , superimposed by a linear combination (specified by ) of the artificial noise observed by receiver A in phase 1. 3) Phase 3,
: sending the confidential symbols with the artificial noise seen by receiver B. In time slots, we send the useful symbols represented by , superimposed by a linear combination (specified by ) of the artificial noise observed by receiver B in phase 1. 4) Phase 4, : repeating the past observations during in phase 2 and 3. The final phase consists in sending a linear combination of receiver B's observation in phase 2 (specified by ) and receiver A's observation in phase 3 (specified by ). The aim of this phase is to complete the equations for the intended receivers to solve the useful symbols without exposing anything new about the message to the unintended receivers. For convenience, we define the block outputs, omitting the block index, Therefore, we can obtain a compact representation of the output signals in each block, omitting the block index, as where we neglected the AWGN for simplicity. Let us define and focus on receiver A. First, we have, for any arbitrary channel realization where in the third inequality the first term is due to the blocktriangular structure of and the second term follows because the rank corresponds to the rank of the identity matrix; the last inequality follows by setting to the exact same form as in (19) except that we replace with .
Next, in order to examine the leakage of to receiver B, we write (27) (28) (29) where (27) follows from the Markov chains and ; (28) is due to another Markov chain ; in (29) we notice that two block columns of is block-triangular and the second term follows by keeping only linearly independent block rows; the last equality is obtained by setting to the exact same form as in (25). As a result, the SDoF is achieved with the proposed scheme. By symmetry of the problem, we have which completes the proof.
Remark 2: As in the wiretap case, the above alignment scheme alone does not guarantee perfect secrecy. Again, we need to combine the artificial noise alignment with random binning. In fact, in the broadcast setting, the alignment creates an equivalent memoryless interference channel . It is shown in [18] that any rate pair with is achievable for any with perfect secrecy Note that the input distribution does not depend on the channel state realization. Hence, we conclude that the results established in Theorem 3 hold with perfect secrecy.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
We studied the impact of delayed CSIT on the MIMO wiretap channel and the MIMO broadcast channel with confidential messages by focusing on the secrecy degrees of freedom (SDoF) metric. The optimal SDoF region of the two-user Gaussian broadcast channel was fully characterized. It is shown that an artificial noise alignment scheme, which can be regarded as a nontrivial extension of the Maddah-Ali Tse alignment, achieves the entire SDoF region. The proposed scheme enables to nicely quantify the resource overhead to be dedicated to secure the confidential messages, which in turn appears as a DoF loss. Although delayed CSIT was found useful to improve the SDoF over a wide range of the MIMO systems, our study somehow revealed the bottleneck of physical-layer security due to its high sensitivity to the quality of CSIT.
Several interesting open problems emerge out of this paper. First, some techniques used for lower-and upper-bounding the SDoF in this paper may serve to enhance further insights into the related problems for moderate SNR regimes. Second, the characterization of the SDoF upper bound of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with delayed partial CSIT remains open. We emphasize that for the case of partial CSIT, the inequalities due to the channel symmetry still hold true, but these do not seem to be enough to prove the converse. The challenge consists of finding novel and tighter inequalities that capture some new asymmetry between and . Finally, the extension to more complex scenarios such as the Gaussian broadcast channel with more than two receivers remains yet another challenging problem. 
where we define for convenience of notation. Furthermore, if the entropy-symmetry holds conditional on some random variable , (30a) and (30b) hold conditional on .
Proof: For , the inequalities (30a) and (30b) hold with equality trivially. It is therefore without loss of generality to assume that . We first prove inequality (30a). It is readily shown that (31) where (31) is from the entropy-symmetry of . Since the righthand side (RHS) of the last equality is decreasing with , (30a) is immediate. 6 For the inequality (30b), we prove it by induction on . For , the only nontrivial case is and , where we have Assume that the result holds to , i.e., (30b) is true for any . We would like to prove that it holds for any . In particular, all we need to prove is that the inequality holds for and any , i.e.,
To this end, we first write
For such that , we can lower-bound the RHS of (33) as where the first inequality is from the fact that applying (30a),
; the last inequality is from the induction assumption, since is such that . For such that , we lower-bound the RHS of (33) differently where the first inequality is from the fact that applying (30a), with by definition; the last inequality is from the induction assumption since is such that . The proof for (32) in complete. It is obvious that if the entropy-symmetry holds conditional on some random variable , the above derivations are still valid by adding the conditioning in every different differential entropy. Therefore, (30a) and (30b) hold conditional on .
By symmetry of the problem, we only need to prove (5a). We first consider the case :
where we define ; (34) is the application of (30b) with the entropy symmetry (4a where the first equality is from the fact that translations preserve differential entropy; (36) holds because removing conditions does not decrease differential entropy; (37) is from the fact that and are independent Gaussian noises; in (38), is the maximum singular value and the inequality is due to for any nonnegative matrices and ; the last equality is true because the channel states do not depend on and that and almost surely. When , applying (30b) gives
whereas for , we have
where is composed of the first elements of and contains the rest; (40) is from the entropy symmetry (4a) in Property 2; (41) is from the positiveness of ; and the last inequality is from the chain rule of differential entropy. Plugging (39) and (42) into (35), we obtain (5a). 
